Although the State bears the burden of persuasion, the exclusion of proof is harmless when we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the same even if the excluded evidence had been allowed.
Texas, U. The Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of his mother, Sandra Rimmer, about the attempted extortion. The following exchange took place on the subject:. See Tenn. As stated, the testimony is probative by the terms of the statute because, if believed, it might cast doubt on the validity of the rape conviction. See Austin, 87 S. That Voyles may have attempted to extort Sandra Rimmer in exchange for the dismissal of the rape charge was indeed relevant and the trial court should have permitted the testimony.
On the other hand, the Defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to the rape and also to burglary and aggravated assault. A court of competent jurisdiction approved the plea and the Defendant served his sentence fully without any collateral challenge, post-conviction or otherwise, to the judgment.
So, even if Voyles unlawfully attempted to solicit funds from the Defendant's mother, that does not mean that the Defendant was innocent of the crimes. Even if Voyles had attempted to extort funds in exchange for the victim's refusal to cooperate with the prosecution, that hardly trumps a knowing and voluntary guilty plea afterward, with all of the required admonitions, by the Defendant, to the charge of rape.
Alabama, U. Thacker, S. Thus, a trial court, in its discretion, conceivably could have found this information admissible when applying the proper standard under Tennessee Code Annotated section c. However, even if this proof meets the liberal admissibility threshold of Tennessee Code Annotated section c , its exclusion at this Defendant's sentencing hearing had no impact on the trial.
The Court of Criminal Appeals properly resolved the issue, holding that because the sentencing jury did hear the very evidence at issue, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:.
At the re-sentencing hearing, Sergeant Robert Shemwell testified he had talked with James Darnell who had attempted to check into the Memphis Inn that morning. Darnell observed through the check-out window a white male bleeding from his hands and another white male on the other side of the check-out window.
Darnell stated that the man appeared very drunk. Darnell believed the other man to have been the clerk. He described the second male as being thirty years of age, long brown hair, moustache and wearing blue jeans. Darnell observed the man believed to be the clerk hand money through the check out window to the other male. Darnell could not positively identify either man from the photospread. A photograph of [the Defendant] was included in the photospread.
In our view, the contested proof would have had a negligible effect on whether the sentencing jury believed that the Defendant actually committed the first-degree murder, which is the key inquiry of residual doubt. While this evidence at the sentencing phase theoretically may have contributed to the Defendant's residual doubt argument, this omission, in the context of the entire sentencing hearing, can be classified as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In short, the sentencing jury heard testimony of Darnell and had the opportunity to consider the validity of the conviction.
Finally, the Defendant argues that the composite drawings, made from Darnell's descriptions, of the men seen at the Memphis Inn should have been permitted into evidence.
The defense argument is similar to that made on the prior issue. The drawings were products of hearsay, but as stated, this fact alone would not render them inadmissible in a sentencing hearing. The drawings were relevant under section c because they would tend to show that the police had a more reasonable basis for considering these other suspects during the course of the investigation.
A description of either of the two men at the crime scene lends some credence to the residual doubt claim. Theoretically, the evidence might cast some doubt on the validity of the murder conviction:. Both the statute and prior case law dictate that the defendant has the right to present at the sentencing hearing, whether by the jury which heard the guilt phase or by a jury on resentencing, evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime or the aggravating or mitigating circumstances, including evidence which may mitigate his culpability.
Evidence otherwise admissible under the pleadings and applicable rules of evidence, is not rendered inadmissible because it may show that the defendant did not kill the victim, so long as it is probative on the issue of the defendant's punishment.
In the context of this sentencing hearing, however, we can conclude that the exclusion of the drawings also qualifies as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentencing jury was made aware that the police had considered other possibilities during the investigation. The sentencing jury had the opportunity to consider those facts as indicative of reasonable doubt and yet chose to impose a death sentence.
In summary, we hold that erroneous exclusion of the mitigating evidence was ultimately harmless under the circumstances of this sentencing hearing. For future reference, however, objections made in capital sentencing hearings based purely upon the rule against hearsay have no basis in law. The Defendant contends that the waiver of his right to testify was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. He argues that in a capital sentencing hearing, the trial court has the obligation to inform defendants that if they limit their testimony on direct examination to mitigating circumstances, they cannot be questioned about the circumstances of the murder.
See Cazes, S. In Momon v. State, 18 S. Zerbst, U. After concluding that a silent record was not enough, we then outlined specific procedures for ensuring that a waiver is properly recorded. The defense should request and the trial judge should permit a hearing out of the presence of the jury to establish on the record that the defendant has personally made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. The trial court must determine that. We observed that this approach limits judicial interference, striking an appropriate balance between safeguarding a precious right and preserving the confidential relationship between an attorney and his client.
Copeland, S. The Defendant concedes that the trial court conducted a hearing out of the presence of the jury under the guise of Momon. During questioning by his counsel, the Defendant acknowledged that he had been informed of his right to testify in the sentencing hearing and that he had personally made the decision not to do so. In this appeal, however, he contends that his right to testify was not properly waived because his counsel did not inform him about the limits to cross-examination in capital cases.
In Cazes, this Court held that a defendant does not waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by testifying to mitigating factors that are wholly collateral to the murder.
The State conceded that Cazes should not have been subjected to cross-examination except as to the mitigating circumstances and this Court agreed. United States, U. Here, the Defendant contends that if his counsel had informed him of the Cazes ruling, he would have chosen to testify instead of insisting upon his right to remain silent. The discrete question presented is whether a defendant must be informed of his ability to testify to collateral mitigating factors in a death penalty sentencing hearing without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination.
That is, must a defendant be informed of the ruling in Cazes as part of a Momon hearing in capital sentencing cases?
We say no. See, e. State, P. Curtis, P. State, 79 Hawai'i , P. Neuman, W. However, the Defendant has not cited, and we have not found, a case from any other jurisdiction that requires a defendant to acknowledge his awareness of a limited cross-examination rule. Likewise, we are apprehensive to expand the Momon inquiry to include specifics of the advice given by defense counsel.
The three general inquiries laid out in Momon are sufficient to ensure a personal waiver of the right to testify in a sentencing hearing.
See People v. York, P. Any additional procedural mandates must not cross the line of propriety. In our view, an expanded Momon proceeding, requiring a defendant and his counsel to place on the record the advantages and disadvantages of testifying in open court, would infringe upon the attorney-client privilege.
In general, courts should guard against overreaching intrusions into the specifics of the defense strategy. The right is to the effective assistance of counsel. The record reflects that the Defendant, professing complete awareness of his right to testify, acknowledged that his decision not to do so was his personal desire. In Momon, the defense counsel unilaterally decided that his client would not testify. He first informed Momon of that fact as they were entering the courtroom for trial.
Momon, 18 S. There was no indication that counsel had spent any time explaining to Momon the advantages and disadvantages of testifying. That was not the case here. The Defendant's only complaint is that his counsel did not explain on the record our ruling in Cazes, which recognized the right of a defendant to testify to mitigating factors without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination. That alone is not sufficient to prove that the Defendant's waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
That the Defendant acknowledged his awareness of the advantages and pitfalls of testifying is sufficient to satisfy Momon. Informing defendants of our ruling in Cazes may be a good practice for defense attorneys, but a communication of that nature falls within the attorney-client privilege.
We are unwilling to hold that failure to explain this evidentiary rule on the record invalidates the waiver of the right to testify.
Louisiana, U. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest easily upon the certainty of guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a doubt that may arise from possibility. In Victor v. Nebraska, U. The specific instruction under review comes from the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions for criminal trials.
Hodges, S. Thus, pattern jury instructions are not entitled to any particular deference on review. Still, this Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of a similar instruction. Hall, S. He asserts that the jury might have understood the instruction to permit a conviction on insufficient evidence.
Jury instructions must be reviewed in their entirety. Guy, S. Phrases may not be examined in isolation. Dellinger, 79 S. The sentence following directs that absolute certainty of guilt is not required. In context, a fair interpretation is that reasonable doubt does not mean a doubt that may arise from mere possibility no matter how improbable.
Naughten, U. In Estelle v. McGuire, U. One ambiguous term does not necessarily constitute error:. Differences among them in interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out in the deliberative process, with commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting.
By the application of this standard, we do not find a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the burden of proof in an unconstitutional way. See Estelle, U.
Although this jury instruction did not result in a denial of due process in this context, we acknowledge the language of this particular instruction may not be helpful.
As such, we discourage the further use of this instruction. Michael Rimmer? I'm involved in prison ministry at Riverbend. No objections were made during any of these instances. During final argument, the subject was not addressed. The State argues that because the Defendant did not raise this issue in his motion for new trial, it has been waived. We disagree. Because this is a capital case, the Defendant may raise this on review at this stage because of the exception to the waiver doctrine in capital cases.
See State v. Nesbit, S. This exception arises from the legislative mandate that this Court review all capital cases. This is consistent with our prior practice. While the issue is reviewable, we nevertheless hold that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. Oklahoma, U. Miller, S. The prosecution did not object to this evidence but wanted to cross examine the witness to show that at the time Miller had been baptized, he was under a sentence of death from a previous trial.
In a pretrial hearing, the trial judge ordered that the defense could offer evidence that Miller had found religion, but also permitted the State to cross examine the witness about the fact that he had been under a sentence of death at the time. The defense decided not to admit the evidence and appealed the ruling. This case is factually distinguishable from Miller.
The jury never actually heard evidence that Miller had been on death row because he chose not to testify after the pretrial ruling. Here, the reference to death row during the sentencing hearing was first made by a defense witness in response to a question by defense counsel. The first reference to death row by the witness Mach appears to have been inadvertent. The third reference came from the same witness in response to a question by the State, asking how long he had been acquainted with the Defendant.
See Miller, S. Phillips, U. Because the references to death row were by a defense witness in response to questions by defense counsel and because the State neither solicited nor actively used that fact in the prosecution, the general rule prohibiting such references is inapplicable.
Tennessee Code Annotated section c 1 requires this Court to determine whether the sentence of death was arbitrarily imposed, whether the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing supported the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances were established beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether the sentence of death was excessive or disproportionate considering similar cases.
This Court must determine whether the evidence supported the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances were established beyond a reasonable doubt and outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the sentencing hearing, the State introduced evidence that the Defendant had been convicted of assault with intent to commit robbery with a deadly weapon and pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in The proof also established that in , the Defendant pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault and rape of the victim. All of these offenses involved the use of violence to the person.
The Defendant attempted to impeach the conviction for rape through testimony by his mother, Sandra Rimmer. She testified that the victim had confided in her that her boyfriend, Tommy Voyles, had pushed her into bringing the rape charges.
The jury implicitly considered this testimony unpersuasive because they found that the State had established the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. In our view, the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury's finding. In mitigation, an expert testified about the Defendant's unstable childhood, his hospitalization for mental problems, and his dropping out of school and entering the workforce at such a young age. There were also three witnesses who testified to the Defendant's religious conversion.
They confirmed his active participation in religious services at the prison. The defense also made an effort to establish residual doubt as to whether the Defendant actually committed the murder. The Defendant advanced alternative theories that either Donald Ellsworth murdered the victim and framed the Defendant by planting her blood in the back seat of his car or that the two unidentified men seen at the Memphis Inn were guilty of the crime.
The jury had an adequate basis to find that the Defendant's troubled childhood and his later religious convictions were not sufficient to outweigh the taint of his prior violent felony convictions. Moreover, the residual doubt evidence was not persuasive given the weight of the overwhelming circumstantial evidence against the Defendant, including his repeated efforts to escape.
Zagorski, S. In our assessment, a reasonable juror could have either discounted any residual doubt testimony or given it very little consideration. Taken as a whole, the evidence sufficiently supports the jury's conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. When a defendant has been sentenced to death, the Tennessee Supreme Court must engage in a comparative proportionality review.
State, 46 S. It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because it is disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime.
Bland, S. To determine whether punishment is disproportionate under the facts of this case, we use the precedent-seeking method of comparative proportionality review.
This requires us to compare this case with previous cases involving similar defendants and similar crimes. Davis, S. In assessing the similarity between the case under review and previous cases, we have looked to the following details about the offense:.
We first consider the circumstances of the offense. The Defendant, an estranged boyfriend, murdered an ex-girlfriend, whose testimony had sent him to prison for rape.
While he was in prison, he had confided to other inmates his intentions to harm the victim. The threats the Defendant had made suggest that the murder was a premeditated act of vengeance. That the murder took place shortly after his release from prison buttresses that inference. The proof established that on the night of the murder, the Defendant sought out the victim at her place of employment, murdered her, and disposed of her body.
While the means of her death is not entirely clear, the bloody crime scene indicated that there was a violent struggle. The body has never been recovered. Shortly after the murder, the Defendant fled the jurisdiction in a stolen car.
After his arrest in Indiana, he sought to escape on more than one instance, even hijacking the extradition van during his return to Tennessee.
Handmade weapons were found in his cell. After breaking off her relationship with the Defendant, the victim had remarried her husband, Donald Ellsworth, by whom she had two children. According to her husband, the victim had accepted her responsibilities as a wife and parent and had become a dependable employee at the Memphis Inn. The victim's mother, husband, and children were impacted by the murder.
The Defendant, having a prior criminal record for violent crimes, was convicted on overwhelmingly persuasive circumstantial evidence. Based on the testimony of two prison inmates, he had planned the murder as an act of revenge. He approached the victim at a time when she was most vulnerable-alone and working after midnight at a hotel.
Nothing suggests that the Defendant was mentally, emotionally, or physically impaired at the time of the murder. Although he was not a good student in secondary school, his academic underachievement did not rise to the level of mental disability.
To say that the Defendant was cooperative with authorities would be far from accurate. He has portrayed no noticeable signs of remorse for his actions. While the Defendant presented evidence that he had committed to Christianity, ministered to other prisoners, and advocated Bible study, that he was out of prison for such a short time before he committed this murder reveals little hope that he is amenable to rehabilitative efforts.
Stevens, 78 S. Given the unique circumstances in each case, perfect symmetry is impossible. Our task is to compare similar cases and similar crimes. In several cases, we have upheld the sentence of death where the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance was the sole aggravating circumstance.
See Copeland, S. Cole, S. McKinney, 74 S. Chalmers, 28 S. Keough, 18 S. We have also upheld the death penalty in several cases that involved the murder of an estranged lover. Stephenson, S. Ivy, S. Faulkner, S. Suttles, 30 S. Hall, 8 S. Porterfield, S. In addition, after reviewing the record, we find no other evidence that the death penalty was imposed in an arbitrary fashion.
We hold, therefore, that the Defendant's death sentence was neither disproportionate nor arbitrary. Finally, we conclude that the Defendant's sentence of death is not disproportionate under the mandatory review criteria of section c 1 of the Tennessee Code Annotated.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. The sentence of death shall be carried out on April 7, , unless otherwise ordered by this Court or other proper authority.
It appearing that the Defendant is indigent, the costs of this appeal are taxed to the State. A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Bondurant, 4 S. Lynn, S. Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee all litigants a hearing before an impartial decision-maker.
In re Cameron, Tenn. Ohio, U. Article VI, Section 11 of the Tennessee Constitution states that judges cannot participate in cases in which they might have even the slightest interest. Neely v. State, 63 Tenn. A similar restriction appears in Tennessee Code Annotated section 1. The purpose of these provisions is to guard against the prejudgment of a litigant's rights and to avoid situations in which the litigants might believe that the court reached a prejudiced conclusion because of interest, partiality or favor.
Chumbley v. State, S. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics A trial before a biased or prejudiced judge is a denial of due process. Wilson v. Wilson, S. See Alley, S. Generally, the terms refer to a state of mind or attitude that works to predispose a judge for or against a party.
Not every bias, partiality, or prejudice merits recusal. Alley, S. Personal bias involves an antagonism toward the moving party, but does not refer to any views that a judge may have regarding the subject matter at issue. If the bias is based upon actual observance of witnesses and evidence given during the trial, the judge's prejudice does not disqualify the judge. However, if the bias is so pervasive that it is sufficient to deny the litigant a fair trial, it need not be extrajudicial.
A trial judge should recuse himself or herself whenever the judge has any doubt as to his or her ability to preside impartially or whenever his or her impartiality can reasonably be questioned. Pannell v. State, 71 S. This is an objective standard. The appearance of impropriety is conceptually distinct from the subjective approach of a judge facing a possible disqualification challenge and does not depend on the judge's belief that he or she is acting properly.
See Liteky v. The trial judge retains discretion over his or her recusal. Smith, S. Unless the evidence in the record indicates that the failure to recuse was an abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with that decision. Hines, S. Appellant Rimmer alleges that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his recusal motion specifically because this same judge committed error in the initial trial regarding the jury verdict, made alleged misstatements in the Rule 12 report, made critical decisions denying a continuance to the defense team and excluding evidence in mitigation, and failed to conduct hearings at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section Adverse rulings by a trial court are not usually sufficient grounds to establish bias.
Moreover, rulings of a trial judge, even if erroneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without more, justify disqualification. Appellant Rimmer alleges that the trial court adopted extraordinary security measures. The record reveals that Appellant Rimmer made numerous escape attempts after being taken into custody and that two weapons were removed from the Appellant's person in the courtroom prior to the original trial.
Appellant Rimmer has not established that the security measures employed by the trial court were not warranted under the circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court's implementation of security measures cannot support a motion for recusal. The Appellant also contends that the trial court demonstrated bias when it refused to re-appoint counsel who were successful in obtaining relief on direct appeal.
Nothing in the record demonstrates that the trial court erred in this respect nor does the Appellant establish how appointment of different counsel established bias by the trial judge or raised a question of impartiality.
The Appellant focuses the majority of his recusal argument toward accusations that the trial judge made numerous misstatements of facts, made numerous questionable statements during the first trial and refused to apply an objective standard regarding his impartiality. While comments made by a judge may be demonstrative of bias or prejudice, the Appellant has failed to direct this Court's attention to any such comments. Moreover, misstatements of fact are insufficient to support a showing of bias.
Likewise, comments made by a judge in a separate and unrelated case cannot be imputed to the case now before us. Norton, F. Hawk, S. Bobby Andrew Higdon, No. There is no indication in the record before us that the trial judge prejudged any factual issues that arose related to the re-sentencing hearing.
After review of the record before this Court and the allegations raised by the Appellant, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for recusal.
On December 19, , Appellant Rimmer filed a motion requesting a continuance of the re-sentencing trial scheduled for January 5, Trial counsel was appointed to represent the Appellant in February , after the Appellant's initial attorneys were granted permission to withdraw. As grounds for the continuance, the Appellant asserted that counsel were not prepared to proceed due to lead counsel's position as lead counsel in another capital murder trial scheduled for January 26, The trial court denied the motion for a continuance.
In its order denying the motion for a new sentencing trial, the trial court noted that no prejudice had resulted from the denial of the continuance. In rendering this decision, the trial court considered the mitigating evidence presented at trial.
The granting of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Odom, S. Russell, 10 S. This Court will reverse the denial of a continuance only if the trial court abused its discretion and the defendant was prejudiced by the denial.
The defendant who asserts that the denial of a continuance constitutes a denial of due process or the right to counsel must establish actual prejudice.
Although the Appellant avers that a continuance was necessary in order for the mitigation specialist to complete her investigation, the record reflects that Dr.
Charvat never indicated that her investigation was not complete. Rather, Dr. Notwithstanding, Dr. The record reveals that Dr. Charvat provided ample testimony regarding the Appellant's background. So that one dated six or seven months ago, is not particularly germane to what's going on today and what we know at this point in time.
Charvat cannot be construed as an assertion that she needed additional time to complete a sufficient mitigation investigation. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court abused its discretion, thereby prejudicing the Appellant.
The matter was remanded for re-sentencing by this Court on May 25, Counsel for the re-sentencing were appointed on March 20, These attorneys were granted permission to withdraw in February , at which time substitute counsel were appointed.
The re-sentencing hearing began on January 5, , nearly three years from the date of reversal and nearly eleven months after trial counsel's appointment. Trial counsel was privy to information in the possession of counsel originally appointed for the re-sentencing. Jimmy D. Although a capital case will clearly require more preparation by defense counsel than a non-capital case, we conclude that counsel was afforded adequate time to familiarize themselves with the facts and present evidence in mitigation on the Appellant's behalf.
There is no indication in the record that eleven months was insufficient time for the attorneys to prepare for the re-sentencing trial. The Appellant had the benefit of a mitigation specialist. The mitigation specialist failed to state that her investigation was complete, but noted that any investigation of this type would be constantly changing.
A review of the record fails to demonstrate that Dr. Charvat's investigation was impeded by the denial of the continuance. Moreover, the record fails to demonstrate what, if any, mitigation proof would have been uncovered had Dr.
Charvat been provided more time. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion nor was the Appellant prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. This issue is without merit. Appellant Rimmer contends that, at the re-sentencing hearing, the prosecutor, Thomas D. Constitution, and Art. The State further asserts that some of the objections were sustained and, in many instances, defense counsel withdrew the question. In general, a prosecutor commits misconduct by the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury.
People v. Strickland, 11 Cal. But the defendant need not show that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or with appreciation for the wrongfulness of the conduct, nor is a claim of prosecutorial misconduct defeated by a showing of the prosecutor's subjective good faith.
Bolton, 23 Cal. Our review of the record reveals approximately twenty-eight objections made by the prosecutor during the course of the re-sentencing hearing.
Grounds for the objections included but were not limited to relevance and hearsay. Many of the objections resulted in defense counsel withdrawing the question. Some objections were sustained, while others were overruled. Bench conferences reveal that the prosecutor, Thomas Henderson, was well aware of the applicable law regarding admissible hearsay and provided rational argument in support of his objections.
The State has a legitimate interest in the outcome of a proceeding and, as such, the State has a legitimate right in advocating its interpretation of applicable law regarding the admissibility of evidence.
While some series of objections were incessant, there is no indication in the record that the objections were without legal basis or were made merely as an attempt to comment upon the credibility of the testimony. We conclude that the objections, viewed either singly or collectively, did not deny the Appellant a fair trial or result in any prejudice. This Court remains convinced that the objections complained of by the Appellant were not the source of any prejudicial error.
Appellant Rimmer contends that the jury verdict is incomplete as it fails to contain a finding that the aggravating circumstance was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Our supreme court rejected the identical argument in State v.
Our supreme court, in doing so, concluded:. Regardless of waiver, a similar issue was rejected by this Court recently in State v. Davidson, S. We concluded that such an error can be distinguished from the reversible error in the verdict form in State v. Carter, S. See Davidson, S. In Carter, the wrong form was used, and the form was not merely silent as to the burden or proof but conflicted with the trial court's instructions regarding the burden.
Like Davidson, the language used in the verdict form in the present case was statutorily mandated, and the trial court repeatedly and clearly instructed the jury that it must find any statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying the Faulkner holding to the facts before this Court, we conclude that the Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue. Appellant Rimmer, reciting the litany of his alleged errors, asserts that this Court should not consider in isolation any errors that this Court would deem harmless.
Appellant Rimmer next raises numerous challenges to the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated sections and Appellant Rimmer argues that the death sentence is imposed capriciously and arbitrarily because 1 the jury is required to unanimously agree to a life verdict in violation of McKoy v. North Carolina, U.
Maryland, U. Our supreme court has rejected each of these arguments. See Hines, S. Brimmer, S. Thompson, S. These claims are without merit. The Appellant also contends that the appellate review process in death penalty cases is constitutionally inadequate. Both arguments have been rejected by our supreme court. See Vann, S. Accordingly, Appellant Rimmer is not entitled to relief on this claim. Appellant Rimmer contends that lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the use of Pavulon with sodium pentothal and potassium chloride creates a risk of unnecessary physical and psychological suffering and because the lethal injection protocol lacks written provisions or other appropriate safeguards.
Our supreme court has recently rejected these claims in Abu-Ali Abdur Rahman v. Bredesen, S. While Appellant acknowledges this ruling, he makes specific challenges as to the validity of our supreme court's reasoning.
We, as an intermediate appellate court, are bound by the decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court as to state and federal constitutional questions. Pendergrass, 13 S. Thus, we decline the Appellant's invitation to revisit this claim. The verdict form also listed the Defendant's felony convictions. If the defendant answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, the answers may later be used against the defendant in a prosecution for perjury or aggravated perjury.
The court shall also inquire whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the district attorney general and the defendant or the defendant's attorney. It is only when defense counsel fails to adequately obtain a waiver that the trial judge should intervene. The failure to comply with the ruling in Momon will not serve as a ground for relief if the record otherwise establishes a personal waiver of the right to testify.
Ricci Lynn Ellsworth, Murderpedia Juan Ignacio Blanco. Special report: Did prosecutors taint Memphis murder trial? Not surprisingly, Rimmer's court-appointed attorney disagrees. Rimmer, then 30, was the obvious suspect. Fellow inmates said Rimmer obsessed over Ellsworth. It wasn't Michael Rimmer. Misleading testimony Deputy District Attorney General John Campbell, who was not involved in Rimmer's trials, disputes the contention that prosecutors withheld evidence that Darnell had identified a different man.
He also led a team which produced the first school health program. He also spearheaded initiatives such as an anemic awareness and treatment program for young women and children as well as a hypothyroidism prevention and treatment program using locally available iodine. Ellsworth also lectured on a wide array of health issues to the community. The eight years of ministry were almost cut in half when his wife became ill with chronic fatigue, allergies and weakness.
One year later, conventional treatments had failed to explain or resolve her health issues. Providentially, Dr. Ellsworth ran across Dr.
Later, they discovered that natural thyroid and progesterone provided a natural solution to the miscarriages they had experienced and thankfully culminated in the healthy birth of their 4th child. After eight years, the Ellsworth family returned from overseas to Dr. His research led him to attend the Pan American Allergy Society medical conference to learn more about treating allergies and natural medicine.
There he met Dr.
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